university 融资、并购与公司控制(第2版) (21世纪MBA教材·金融系列) 第312页
作者:wyyx天水 时间:2020-08-22 19:17 浏览(787)
[35] Daines, Robert, "Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?", Journal of Financial Economics, 2001, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 525-558.[36] Daley, Lane, Vikas Mehrotra, and Ranjini Sivakumar, "Corporate Focu

[35] daines, robert, "does delaware law improve firm value?", journal of financial economics, 2001, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 525-558.[36] daley, lane, vikas mehrotra, and ranjini sivakumar, "corporate focus and value creation: evidence from spinoffs", journal of financial economics, 1997, vol. 45, pp. 257-281.[37] dann, l. and h. deangelo, "standstill agreements, privately negotiated stock repurchases, and the market for corporate control", journal of financial economics, 1983, vol. 11, pp. 275-300.[38] demsetz, harold, and kenneth lehn, "the structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences", journal of political economy, 1985, vol. 93, no. 6, pp. 1155-1177.[39] derrien, francois, ipo pricing in "hot" market conditions: who leaves money on the table?, university of toronto, 2003.[40] desai, h. and p. c. jain. "firm performance and focus: long-run stock market performance following spinoffs", journal of financial economics, october 1999, pp. 75-101.[41] chatterjee, r. and a. kuenzi, "mergers and acquisitions: the influence of methods of payment on didder's share price", judge institute of management, cambridge university, research paper 2001, no. 2001/6.[42] edwards, j. s. and a. j., "weichenrieder, ownership concentration and share valuation: evidence from germeny", 1999, cambridge university, working paper 8285.[43] faccio, m. and m. lasfer, "managerial ownership, board structure and firm value: the uk evidence", 1999, city university working paper.[44] faccio, m. and r. masulis, "the choice of financing methods in european mergers & acquisitions", journal of finance, 2005, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 1345-1388.[45] fama, eugene f., "agency problems and the theory of the firm", journal of political economy, 1980, vol. 88, pp. 288-307.[46] ferrara, ralph c., meredith m. brown, and john h. hall, "takeovers attack and survival, a strategist's manual", lexis law publishing, 1987, pp. 275, 291-293.[47] fleming, michael j., "new evidence on the effectiveness of the proxy mechanism", federal reserve bank of new york research paper, 1995, vol. 3.[48] golbe, devra l·, and lawrence j. white, "catch a wave: the time series behavior of mergers", review of economics and statistics, 1993, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 493-499.[49] harris, m. and raviv, a., "corporate control contest and capital structure", journal of financial economics, 1988, vol. 20 (1), pp. 55-86.[50] hart, oliver, firms, contracts and financial structure, oxford university press, 1995.[51] heinkel, r. and zechner, j. "the role of debt and preferred stock as a solution to adverse investment incentives", journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 1990, 25: pp. 1-24.[52] helwege, jean, and nellie liang, "initial public offerings in hot and cold markets", ohio state university and federal reserve board, 2002.[53] heron, r. a., and w. g.. lewellen, "an empirical analysis of the reincorporation decision", journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 1998, vol. 33, pp. 549-568.